2015年10月25日 星期日

Interview with T. George Harris:訪問媒體人T. George Harris談Peter Drucker一生

在21世紀前幾小時,訪問媒體人T. George Harris談Peter Drucker一生事業、人生,與他共同弄短命的期刊Career Today 的回憶。內容親切、豐富多元:日本的Drucker全集、對其深入了解、Deming, W. Edwards ( 1900-1993),; Juran, J. M. (Joseph M. 1904-2008)和 Peter F. Drucker (1909-2005) 三人在紐約大學共事過 ,是日本轉型的三大功臣。

Drucker 為The Mechanical Bride by Marshall McLuhan (1951) 寫序、介紹。
The Mechanical Bride:Folklore of Industrial Man(漢譯本:馬歇爾•麥克盧漢著《機器新娘》,何道寬譯,中國人民大學出版社,2004年10月版)。目前只能採取抽樣方式。日文本1968年由竹内書店出版:『機械の花嫁』(1968,井坂学訳,369p.,980日圓,這書2000年再版『機械の花嫁──産業社会のフォークロア』 :竹内書店新社,369p. ISBN:4803500401,2000)  
T. George Harris 認為Drucker 寫得最好的書是
  • 1969的 The Age of Discontinuity (New York: Harper & Row)


    斷絕的時代  作 者:彼得‧杜拉克 著 / 莊宏信 陳瑞珍 林錦勝 譯
    出版社:協志工業叢書出版(股):1978年3月 第五版81971
德魯克《不連續的時代張心漪譯,遠東圖書,,1971



「天行健,君子以自強不息」,整個人類的文明歷史,就是繼往開來,生生不息的過程產物。現今我們所面臨的正是舊時創造的事項已趨於窮盡,新的轉機有待開展的時代。管理大師彼得‧杜拉克以其慧眼獨具的筆觸,勾畫出現今斷絕不續的世界輪廓。他從已經展現在地平線上的四個方面著手,指出新的流趨所向;新技術的開發,造成主要的新產業;由「國際經濟體系」轉變為「世界經濟體系」,取代缺乏政策、理論與機構的現行經濟體系;社會政治上新的多元機構,其實體存在構成政治、哲學和精神上的激烈挑戰;以遍及大眾教育為基礎的知識新宇宙,以及其於工作、生活、休閒活動與領導上的意涵。



Interview with T. George Harris



Juran  soon joined the faculty of New York University as an adjunct professor in the Department of Industrial Engineering, where he taught courses in quality control and ran round table seminars for executives.





T. George Harris worked on the editorial staff of Time magazine from 1949-1962, launched a short-lived magazine Careers Today with Peter Drucker, and went on to serve as editor of Psychology Today from 1969-1976. Harris describes Drucker as "a...













Interviews; Deming, W. Edwards (William Edwards), 1900-1993; Juran, J. M. (Joseph M.), 1904-; Drucker, Peter F. (Peter Ferdinand), 1909-2005; Drucker, Peter F. (Peter Ferdinand), 1909-2005--Philosophy; Journalism; Pensions; International Union,...

從戴明博士的紐約小套房說起

現在的資訊網很奇妙。我10月14日做一場"戴明與杜拉克在紐約大學的商學研究院:一段友情。我當時把商學研究院GBA錯寫成GBS。

今天,我想研究他1945年在紐約買的小套房,為教學和辦公方便才買的。我用"w edwards deming new york apartment"搜索,第1頁就有兩條讓我想深入去看看,首先是一本Frank Voehl先生主編的"Deming The Way We Knew " (謝謝Frank十幾年前從美國寄一本到台灣送我),Frank和Gerald Glasser 都分別回憶他們有幸到那套房聊天的樂趣和榮幸;Glasser的那篇,更是1976年10月14為慶祝Dr. Deming 75歲生日的頌文,談他怎麼到紐約大學修課,後來當戴明博士的統計顧問的助手所見所學......Deming博士將它裱起來,掛在套房的牆上多年.....

另一則是曾是Dr DEMING博士學生的 J. N. Orsini ,為【從17世紀到20世紀的統計學名人】寫篇W. Edwards Deming(在第7分的"科學與技術上的應用", pp.355-60:
Leading Personalities in Statistical Sciences: From the Seventeenth Century ...
 edited by Norman L. Johnson, Samuel Kotz (1997)

我還讀到戴明檔案中的書信部份的一些通信人:R. T. Birge, Harold Dodge, Churchill Eisenhart, Gregory Lidstone, Jerzy Neyman, John Tukey, W. Allen Wallis, Peter Drucker, Joseph Juran, Ichiro Ishikawa, and Kenichi Koyanagi. 等等。這些對我寫傳記有幫助。



2015年10月25日下午10:35 ·
現在的資訊網很奇妙。我10月14日做一場"戴明與杜拉克在紐約大學的商學研究院:一段友情。我當時把商學研究院GBA錯寫成GBS。
今天,我想研究他1945年在紐約買的小套房,為教學和辦公方便才買的。我用"w edwards deming new york apartment"搜索,第1頁就有兩條讓我想深入去看看,首先是一本Frank Voehl先生主編的"Deming The Way We Knew " (謝謝Frank十幾年前從美國寄一本到台灣送我),Frank和Gerald Glasser 都分別回憶他們有幸到那套房聊天的樂趣和榮幸;Glasser的那篇,更是1976年10月14為慶祝Dr. Deming 75歲生日的頌文,談他怎麼到紐約大學修課,後來當戴明博士的統計顧問的助手所見所學......Deming博士將它裱起來,掛在套房的牆上多年.....
另一則是曾是Dr DEMING博士學生的 J. N. Orsini ,為【從17世紀到20世紀的統計學名人】寫篇W. Edwards Deming(在第7分的"科學與技術上的應用", pp.355-60:
Leading Personalities in Statistical Sciences: From the Seventeenth Century ...
edited by Norman L. Johnson, Samuel Kotz (1997)
我還讀到戴明檔案中的書信部份的一些通信人:R. T. Birge, Harold Dodge, Churchill Eisenhart, Gregory Lidstone, Jerzy Neyman, John Tukey, W. Allen Wallis, Peter Drucker, Joseph Juran, Ichiro Ishikawa, and Kenichi Koyanagi. 等等。這些對我寫傳記有幫助。

Drucker 談 Alfred P. Sloan; Deming 談 Morris H Hansen




Alfred P. Sloan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_P._Sloan

Sloan's memoir, My Years with General Motors, written in the 1950s but withheld from publishing until an updated version was finally released in 1964,  ...

斯隆的專業風采,出自 {旁觀者-管理大師杜拉克回憶錄 }(Adventures of A Bystander)



Alfred Sloan, 187, 203, 205, 211, 461;《我在通用汽車的日子》(My Years with General Motors), 204 系統與變異: 淵博知識與理想設計法 (2010) 的索引 (1) a-e
February 18, 1966
OBITUARY

Alfred P. Sloan Jr. Dead at 90; G.M. Leader and Philanthropist

By THE NEW YORK TIMES
Alfred P. Sloan Jr., who shaped the General Motors Corporation into one of the world's largest manufacturing enterprises, died of a heart attack yesterday afternoon at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Center here. He was 90 years old.
Mr. Sloan had been in excellent health until Tuesday, when he complained of not feeling well. He was taken to the hospital, which his philanthropy helped to establish, on Wednesday afternoon from his home at 820 Fifth Avenue. He succumbed yesterday at 2:35 P.M.
With him at the hospital was his brother, Raymond P., special lecturer in the School of Public Health and Hospital Administration of Columbia University.
Mr. Sloan was acclaimed last night as one of the great captains of industry of his age, not alone for his managerial skills but also for the pioneering automotive advances that he oversaw. These included four-wheel brakes, ethyl gasoline, crankcase ventilation and knee-action front springs.
In a joint statement Frederic G. Donner, chairman of General Motors, and James W. Roche, its president, said:
"His contributions to science and education and those of the foundation that bears his name were matched only by his accomplishments in business and industry."
Mr. Sloan made his mark, his associates said, "as a planner, organizer and administrator."
Roy Abernathy, president of the American Motors Corporation, called Mr. Sloan "the most advanced practitioner of modern management of our time."
A friend in the industry, Lynn A. Townsend, president of the Chrysler Corporation, said last night that Mr. Sloan's "services to our nation and our industry cannot be measured."
In Detroit, Henry Ford 2d, chairman of the Ford Motor Company, extolled Mr. Sloan as "one of the small handful of men who actually made automotive history."
"Under his leadership," Mr. Ford said, "General Motors developed from a loosely organized group of companies into the present highly efficient giant corporation."
At his death Mr. Sloan was honorary chairman of General Motors, and in this capacity he had attended a board of directors meeting here last month. Associates who talked with him then said yesterday that he participated in the session with his usual acuity.
Mr. Sloan headed General Motors as president and then chairman from 1923 to 1956.
His Work, His Hobby, His Love
In the nineteen-thirties when Alfred Pritchard Sloan Jr. was chief executive officer of the General Motors Corporation a friend told him that a man of his position ought to own a yacht. After some hesitation, the slim, dandily dressed industrialist agreed and bought a 236-footer for $1 million.
He incorporated it, christened it Rene, hired a crew of 43 at an annual cost of $119,609 and embarked on a few cruises. But life afloat quickly bored him, and the yacht was virtually laid up until he sold it in 1941 to the Maritime Commission for $175,000.
This nautical flying was notable in Mr. Sloan's life because it was one of the few ventures that did not turn a handsome profit and because it was a leisure-time caper. Indeed, it was perhaps his only frivolity, for Mr. Sloan did not smoke, rarely drank, read little for pleasure and never engaged in golf or any other sport. A functional, frill-less man, he was convinced that sports were a waste of a man's time.
Such dissipations, moreover, interfered with his work, his hobby, his love--the running of General Motors. Even in retirement, when Mr. Sloan was administering his multimillion dollar medical and educational benefactions, his sole relaxation was an evening's television watching.
When Mr. Sloan became vice president of operations of General Motors in 1920 the company accounted for less than 12 percent of motor vehicle sales in the nation; when he stepped down as chairman in 1956 its share was 52 per cent. Moreover, General Motors had expanded into one of the world's largest companies. It was also among the most profitable and, operationally, one of the smoothest.
These accomplishments were credited to Mr. Sloan's management policies. He centralized administration and decentralized operations, grouping together those that had a common relationship. He also realigned the company's products so that one brand of automobiles did not conflict with another. Each product--cars, electric iceboxes or whatever--was set apart in its own division. It was part of Mr. Sloan's genius that he was familiar with every detail of each division.
Along Staff Lines
In his 14 years as president of General Motors (1923-37) and in almost 20 years as chairman of the board (1937-56) Mr. Sloan ran the company on the staff principle, with himself as chief. But despite the eminence of his position he did not comport himself like an autocrat, nor did he hoot and holler. (He was known throughout the organization as "Silent Sloan.") He also refrained from ordering underlings about.
"I never give orders," Mr. Sloan once said. "I sell my ideas to my associates if I can. I accept their judgment if they convince me, as they frequently do, that I am wrong. I prefer to appeal to the intelligence of a man rather than attempt to exercise authority over him."
An associate likened him to a roller bearing--"self-lubricating, smooth, eliminates friction and carries the load." A typical workday bore out this portrayal.
Mr. Sloan arrived at his office in the General Motors Building, 1775 Broadway (at 57th Street) at 9:30 A.M. (In winter he drove from his 14-room apartment on Fifth Avenue; in summer he commuted to Pennsylvania Station from his 25 acres in Great Neck, L.I., and rode the subway to West 59th Street.)
Father Was Well-to-Do
With metronomic precision he ticked off the day's conferences. He was restless, squirming in his chair, gesturing, putting his small, well-shod feet on the table. When he talked, it was in a quiet voice that curled out of the side of his mouth with a trace of a Brooklyn accent. When he listened, it was with the extra intentness of the deaf.
By 5:30 he was ready to depart for home with a briefcase under his arm; and after dinner with his wife he usually worked for a few hours and was in bed at 10 o'clock. Two weeks a month he spent in Detroit, where he rarely stirred out of the gray G.M. building, not even to a hotel.
Summarizing his recipe for success, Mr. Sloan said:
"Get the facts. Recognize the equities of all concerned. Realize the necessity of doing a better job every day. Keep an open mind and work hard. The last is most important at all. There is no short cut."
He was born in New Haven on May 23, 1875. His father was a well-to-do coffee and tea importer, and later a wholesale grocer. The Sloans moved to 240 Garfield Place, Brooklyn, when Alfred Jr., was 10. He attended public school until he was 11, when he entered Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute where he established a reputation as a prodigy in mechanics and engineering. At 17 he enrolled in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, and by grinding away every possible minute he graduated in three years.
With his father's help Alfred got a draftsman's job in the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company at Harrison, N. J. The company was not doing very well, but Alfred had confidence that it could be made to show a profit. He persuaded his father and another man to put up $5,000 and place him in control. In the first six months the business yielded $12,000 in profits.
It was the automotive industry, however, that made the company's fortune. Automakers had been using a heavily greased wagon axle until Mr. Sloan persuaded the Olds Motors Company to try his bearings. Henry Ford and the other manufacturers soon followed suit, and Hyatt Bearing started making money hand over fist.
By 1916 the company was doing a gross business of $10-million a year and making profits as high as $4-million. Of equal importance, Mr. Sloan had made a name for himself in Detroit as a knowledgeable and reliable business man with keen insights into the auto industry.
His First $5-Million
By that year General Motors, replacing Ford, had become Mr. Sloan's largest customer, and there was some hint that it might make its own bearings. Instead, General Motors, which had been stitched together from several independent auto concerns by the mercurial William Crapo Durant, bought Hyatt for $13.5-million.
He promptly merged it with some other parts and accessory companies into the United Motors Corporation and installed Mr. Sloan as president. In the process Mr. Sloan pocketed his first $5-million, a start on a fortune that was to rise to $250-million.
Late in 1918, through the initiative of John J. Raskob, General Motors took over United Motors as its own parts division, and Mr. Sloan went along as its executive head. Successively, he was named a member of the G. M. board of directors and a vice president.
Meanwhile, Mr. Durant, his backer and sponsor, was swept out of the company through stock purchases by the du Pont interests. Two and a half million shares passed to them in a single day.
Pierre S. du Pont thereupon became president of General Motors, but being unfamiliar with the motor-car business he leaned on Mr. Sloan, who became vice president of operations in 1920. Three years later Mr. du Pont left the presidency and put Mr. Sloan in the chair.
The corporation's net sales were then $698-million; six years later there were $1.5- billion. In the process, General Motors' Chevrolet displaced Ford as sales leader in the low-price field, and the market price of its stock was up 480 per cent.
This growth cost Mr. Sloan much leg work. "It may surprise you to know," he said at the time, "that I have personally visited, with many of my associates, practically every city in the United States, from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Canada to Mexico.
"On these trips I visit from 5 to 10 dealers a day. I meet them in their own places of business, talk with them across their own desks and solicit from them suggestions and criticisms as to their relations with the corporation."
And a Sloan visit was not soon forgotten, for Mr. Sloan was 6 feet tall and weighed 130 pounds. He arrived dressed in what was then the height of fashion--a dark, double- breasted suit, a high starch collar, conservative tie fixed with a pearl stickpin, a handkerchief cascading out of his breast pocket and spats. It was enough to awe any dealer.
When Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933 Mr. Sloan at first cooperated with the New Administration, becoming a member of the Industrial Advisory Board of the National Recovery Administration. When the dollar was devalued, however, the New Deal lost a friend and gained a persistent critic.
Early in 1937 Mr. Sloan encountered one of the major crises of his business life when newly organized workers in General Motors plants staged a 44-day sitdown strike to obtain union recognition.
The industrialist haughtily refused to deal with the strikers while they "continue to hold our plants unlawfully." He joined the chorus of those assailing John L. Lewis, head of the Committee for Industrial Organization, as seeking to dominate the motor industry. President Roosevelt rebuked him, public sympathy ran against him and he beat a retreat, which was signalized when Gov. Frank Murphy of Michigan brought labor and management together.
Mr. Sloan, however, did not carry on the negotiations personally. He remained in New York, delegating the distasteful job to William S. Knudsen, then vice president in charge of operations, and other executives. A few months later he turned over the company presidency to Mr. Knudsen and became chairman of the board.
A month later, in June, 1937, Mr. Sloan was in the headlines again when Treasury experts reported to a Congressional committee that he and his wife had avoided payment of $1,921,587 in income taxes over a three-year period through personal holding companies.
Although there was no Government charge that this means of tax avoidance was illegal, the implications were so unpleasant that Mr. Sloan issued a statement denying that he ever sought to evade a just share of the tax burden. He said that he and his wife had received in 1936 income totaling $2,876,310. Their Federal and state income taxes, he asserted, ate up $1,725,790, and the remainder--$1,150,520--was divided evenly between charity and themselves.
Toward the end of the year Mr. Sloan made a substantial foray into philanthropy by endowing the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation with $10-million. In announcing the benefaction, he said:
"Having been connected with industry during my entire life, it seems eminently proper that I should turn back, in part, the proceeds of that activity with the hope of promoting a broader as well as a better understanding of the economic principles and national policies which have characterized American enterprise down through the years."
Up to 1966 the value of Mr. Sloan's gifts to the foundation and those of his wife, Irene, totaled $305-million, of which about $130-million has been given away. The gifts have not been restricted to economic studies.
One of the foundation's first large benefactions was in 1945--provision of $2.56-million for the establishment of the Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research in New York, a component of the Memorial Cancer Center. Grants of $300,000 annually were also made at the same time to help finance research. Charles F. Kettering, the co-sponsor of the institute, was a close friend of Mr. Sloan's and director of the General Motors Research Laboratory. Until his death he was an institute trustee.
Additional funds were given the institute over the years, and it and the hospital were eventually reorganized as the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, with a medical and scientific staff of 1,500 persons.
Another recipient of Mr. Sloan's benefactions was M.I.T., his alma mater. These included a laboratory for study of automotive and aircraft engines and aeronautical engineering problems. In 1945 he gave $350,000 for an industrial management professorship and four years later he donated $1-million for a metals processing laboratory.
In 1950 the Sloan Foundation gave M.I.T. $5.25-million for a School of Industrial Management, subsequently named the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management. Mr. Sloan gave the school $1-million for management research in 1952.
The foundation also gave M.I.T. $5-million to establish a Center for Advanced Engineering Study, whose students are practicing engineers and professors of engineering.
Two years ago Mr. Sloan established the Alfred P. Sloan Fund for Basic Research in the Physical Sciences at M.I.T. The fund included a personal gift of $5-million from Mr. Sloan and an equal amount from his foundation. Last year a similar fund was established at the California Institute of Technology.
As a further venture into education, the Sloan Foundation in 1958 established a program under which four-year scholarships are awarded to outstanding college students. Forty- five institutions now participate in the project, in which 600 students are enrolled.
In an official biographical sketch issued by Mr. Sloan's office in 1966, his attitude toward philanthropy was outlined. "As chairman of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation," the sketch said, "Mr. Sloan has the responsibility of establishing the fact that every proposed grant is a sound investment in some area of human need, and not in any sense of the word a 'giveaway'; further, that adequate responsibility exists to administer the program intelligently. Here is Mr. Sloan's description of what a foundation should be--a well- organized, efficiently managed business enterprise with a wholesome respect for every dollar at its disposal."
A friend once put it more directly, saying, "He's no Scrooge, but he still knows the value of a dollar."
In World War II General Motors, under Mr. Sloan's direction, converted its automotive plants to the manufacture of armaments. A total of 102 plants was involved, and from February, 1942, to September, 1945, no automobiles were produced. Reconversion was a back-breaking process, but it was accomplished more smoothly than many observers had predicted, for virtually all G.M. lines were back in civilian production by the end of 1945.
After the war General Motors expanded its activities in the household appliance field and in diesel motors. The company also developed overseas plants and outlets.
In 1946 Mr. Sloan stepped down as the company's chief executive officer after 25 years in that post. He remained as chairman of the board until 1956, when he was elected honorary chairman, a position he held until his death.
Held Corporate Posts
Although Mr. Sloan's business life was centered on General Motors, he was a director of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Pullman Company, J. P. Morgan & Co., the Kennecott Copper Corporation, the Johns Manville Corporation and the Braden Copper Company.
In retirement, Mr. Sloan turned his mind to writing a book. "My Years With General Motors" was published in 1964 by Doubleday. A documented insider's story of the management of General Motors. It sold more than 50,000 hard-cover copies.
In it, he told why one management is successful and another is not. "The causes of success or failure are deep and complex," he wrote, "and chance plays a part. Experience has convinced me, however, that for those who are responsible for a business, two important factors are motivation and opportunity. The former is supplied in good part by incentive compensation, the latter by decentralization."
Mr. Sloan also took time to reply to critics of General Motors and its success. "General Motors has become what it is because of its people and the way they work together, and because of the opportunity afforded those people to participate in an enterprise which combined their activities efficiently.
"The field was open to all; technical knowledge flows from a common storehouse of scientific progress; the techniques of production are an open book, and the related instruments of production are available to all. The market is world-wide, and there are no favorites except those chosen by the customers."
Also in retirement, Mr. Sloan devoted himself to his foundation. He maintained daily hours at its offices, 630 Fifth Avenue. On days when he had no luncheon engagement, he ate in his paneled office. His fare was a homemade sandwich, which he had brought with him, neatly wrapped in paper, in his coat pocket.
The office was always brightened by fresh flowers and it contained a portrait of his wife, the former Irene Jackson, whom he married in 1898. She died in 1956. They had no children.
In addition to Raymond, Mr. Sloan is survived by two other brothers, Harold S. and Clifford A., both of New York, and sister, Mrs. Katherine Sloan Pratt of Syossett, L.I.
A funeral service will be held tomorrow at 11 A.M. in Christ Church Methodist, 520 Park Avenue. There will be no pallbearers. Until the funeral, his body will be at Frank E. Campbell's, Madison Avenue at 81st Street.
Burial will be private at St. John's Cemetery, Cold Spring Harbor, L.I.
------

Morris H Hansen,

在美國人囗普查局的發揚與運用。在大型機構之中,進行品質和生產力全面改善,最早期而且最成功的例子,要算是1937年,在Morris H. Hansen所領導的人囗普查局了。無數的作業在普查局的生產線上界於A.現場計數人員或問卷回郵及B.最終出版之圖表間展開了。
   每個月和每一季的調查,包括︰失業、批發商品的流動、罹病率,與其他有關於個人和企業的一些特性,以作為企業和政府安排計劃時的主要參考。這種調查的精密度,要十分可靠,而不容出問題。
速度是必需的,以免數據過時,但不可因而不計較準確度。要同時改善速度和準確度,有賴新的訓練與督導方法,並借助於統計方法來完成。
   一些由Morris H. Hansen和他的同事所撰寫的若干重要文獻與著作,顯示對抽樣的改進、非抽樣誤差的減少,與這兩者之間求得經濟的平衡點。在一九三九到一九五五年間的著作和文獻中,此處無法摘述。在1953年,由HansenHurwitz,與Madow合著的Sampling Survey Method and Theory, Vol.1Vol. 2Wiley,1953)一書中曾詳細提到。
   若非人口普查局顧問與最高管理階層的支持,由普查所帶來對品質和生產力的貢獻,恐怕也就無從談起。
全世界從事普查的團體,都如同手足,並且互相學習。我們的普查局更是扮演著一個替全世界改進品質與生產力的要角。
----
美國人口統計調查局(Census)的統計組織,是約在1940 年由Morris H. Hansen博士所手創,其計畫如圖61。1945年後,該局在品質及生產力的卓越成就上,已領先各國相當之單位。值得一提的,該局是服務機構,也是政府機構。


-----第5章新領導力
某位領導的例子。茲舉個實例,或許有助於說明我用領導者的意思。在歷史上有許許多多的領導者,有些是對人有利的善人,有些則是惡人。我的故友韓森(Morris H. Hansen 1990109過世,享年79),是個偉大而良善的領導者,足為典範。 (譯按,參考《轉危為安》第7服務組織的品質與生產力在美國人囗普查局的運用一節)
    1929年美國股市大崩盤之後,全國陷人經濟大蕭條。在1930年代,失業非常嚴重,當時對「失業者」還沒有可運作的定義,但有一個通用的名詞是「有工資者」(gainful worker)
    至於不屬於「有工資者」的人究竟有多少,每位專家各有不同的估計,而且數字差異很大,因而都不被當局採用。
    國會對於這些離譜的估計值很不滿意,下令對非「有工資者」進行全面普查。
他們命令全國的郵務士,都必須負責向自己郵遞路線上的每個人去蒐集其就業資訊。位於華府的郵政總局,有郵務士的完整名冊,因此這看起來應該是一件很簡單的工作。奉命執行這項任務的聯邦緊急救難署(The Federal Emergency Relief Administration),聘請畢格斯(John B. Biggers)主持研究。因此,後來這項研究就被稱為畢格斯研究。由於取得的資料量過於龐大,完全派不上用場是可想而知的。
    另一方面,韓森當時只有24歲,自1935年起於華盛頓的人口普查局任統計員的工作。他曾在大學選修統計理論的課程,有一些機率理論以及調查誤差等方面的知識。他擬訂一個計畫,以隨機的方式選取52條郵遞路線,加以特別處理,除了涵蓋的範圍完整,也深入了解相關問題的回答的意義。
   韓森根據抽樣郵遞路線所作的研究結果,出版了一本薄薄的報告,也為國會接受。而畢格斯的普查研究,因為有太多未作答與錯誤回答,被人束之高閣。
   我要說的是,韓森是一位真正的領導者:他的腦海中有一些機率理論,同時也能基於務實的考量,設計郵遞路線的樣本,以取得必要的資訊。再者,他有能力將自己的計畫說明給別人了解。
  他明白無法以一己之力來完成這項計晝,所以他說服了許多有意願並能夠了解他的理論的人士,共同參與這項工作。以下是其中部分名單:
郝瑟(Philip M. Hausr)博士狄瑞克(Carvert L. Dedrick)博士,人口普查局統計長史帝芬(Fredrick F. Stephan)﹐顧問史篤佛(Samuel A.Stouffer)博士,威斯康辛大學社會學教授,顧問韋布(JohnWebb),負責執行工作
    附帶一提,韓森的郵務士樣本有可能並不符合國會的原要求,因為當初國會曾經指明,這次研究應該包括每一家庭在內,以求結果能夠精確。
   這項研究的另一個貢獻,是把「勞動力」、「失業」以及「部分就業」的概念以及其可運作定義界定出來。 (注1)
   此後,美國政府不斷以統計方法進行調查工作。工作進展署(Works Progress Administrationn)在史鐸克(J.C. Stock)與弗蘭可(Lester Frankel)的指導下開始每季(後來改為每月)調查失業的狀況,1940年以後改由人口普查局執行。之後還有每月和每季的生活費用的物價調查,以及房屋開工率調查,都是以機率理論為指導。
卡普特(J.C. Capt)於1940年出任人口普查局的局長。他具有識人之能,重用具有領導能力的人士,像韓森,當時已升任助理局長的郝瑟、以及擔任顧問的史帝芬和史篤佛。卡普特先生有完全的決策自由,他曾經告訴我說:「只有總統才能阻止我。」
   1940年美國人口普查中,關於個人以及家庭資訊的蒐集,主要是靠平均每20個人抽1個人,每20家抽1家。抽樣方式提升了結果的精確度﹐也節省了許多製表的時間與經費。
   不久之後,世界各國政府紛紛派員跟韓森學習,人口普查局為此特別成立一個專門接待與指導的部門,由狄瑞克主管。
   韓森William N. Hurwitz的協助下,知識與地位不斷提升,於1945年升任人口普查局的助理局長﹐專門負責人口普查局的統計標準。

  在《轉危為安》英文書第467頁上所示的組織虛線關係圖,就是韓森當年為人口普查局所作的整體規劃模式,圖中的虛線,代表了負責人口、農業、政府、生命、地理等不同統計工作的人員與韓森(即領導者)之間的關係。


Census Crunch Time



Published: January 8, 2009
President-elect Barack Obama has pledged to quickly nominate a commerce secretary after his first choice, Gov. Bill Richardson of New Mexico, withdrew this week. Frankly, the far more pressing task at the Commerce Department is to name a new director of the Census Bureau.
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Times Topics: Census Bureau


With only a year to go before the nationwide count in 2010, Mr. Obama needs to nominate a strong new director who can move swiftly to counteract years of political meddling and neglect that have left the bureau ill prepared to conduct the next census.
This page has issued many warnings about the bureau’s state of unreadiness, as have members of Congress and advocates for groups that tend to be undercounted in a less-than-robust census, especially racial and ethnic minorities, immigrants, the poor and the disabled. In November, Congressional investigators named the 2010 census as one of 13 issues requiring Mr. Obama’s immediate attention.
Any further delay increases the chances, which are already too high, of a botched census in 2010. That would be a very expensive failure of a constitutionally mandated duty on Mr. Obama’s watch. The damage would be compounded in 2012, when the new census data will be used by state governments to redraw electoral districts. If the census is not accurate, the electoral map also would not be — for years to come.
If Mr. Obama and his team need any more reasons to act now to rescue the census, they should note that the party most likely to benefit from a faulty count is certainly not their own. That’s because an inaccurate census generally overcounts people who tend to fit the Republican profile — white, English-speaking and suburban — and to undercount diverse, mobile urban populations.
The census also is used to allocate federal aid to states — an increasingly important issue in the midst of the country’s deep economic troubles.
More than a month ago, this page noted that the director of the acclaimed 2000 census, Kenneth Prewitt, would be the obvious choice to pull the 2010 census out of the hat. If the Obama team has a better candidate, it’s past time to put his or her name forward.

人口普查漏列少數裔 兩黨政爭焦點

國會參議員葛雷格(Judd Gregg,共和黨,新罕布夏州)本月12日退出商務部長提名,不僅使歐巴馬總統邀請共和黨人士入閣的努力破局,舊金山紀事報23日指出,此事還凸顯一年後將進行的2010年人口普查,已成為兩黨政爭的焦點。
人口普查本身即具有高度的政治性,事關選區視人口增減重新公平規劃,影響國會議員席位分配;聯邦政府也將根據人口普查數據,決定撥給地方政府的公路、學校、警察經費,因此備受政界重視。
葛雷格退出提名時公然表示,他與歐巴馬就2010年人口普查,有「無法化解的歧見」。問題在於,歐巴馬決定把原屬商務部主管的人口普查,讓白宮扮演更重要角色。早先的報導指出,歐巴馬政府擬把人口普查局的預算追加70億至80億元,也令葛雷格不滿。
舊金山紀事報指出,歐巴馬的行動旨在安撫非洲裔和拉丁美洲裔,他們抗議任命葛雷格出任商務部長,因為他一向主張限制人口普查局經費。
他們擔心,葛雷格上任後,將使人口普查少算非洲裔和拉丁美洲裔人口問題,更加嚴重。
歐巴馬加強白宮對人口普查的監督權,激怒了共和黨人士,指控他放任民主黨「奪權」。歐巴馬強調,他沒有剝奪商務部主管人口普查的權力,但無論如何,葛雷格退出提名。
紀事報指出,華府這場戲劇化政爭的背後,有一個長期問題:窮人、移民和年輕人,很難清點,因為他們流動性太高,而且不大理會人口普查的清點員。
都市的少數族裔被人口普查漏列,是政爭的焦點。他們通常投票支持民主黨,所以民主黨對人口普查非常認真。相對的,少算這類人口,對共和黨比較有利。

2015年10月24日 星期六

日本、歐洲、美國的經理人對Drucker和Deming的管理學論述的接納


Managing in a Time of Great Change (1995;New York: Truman Talley Books/Dutton)
視野 : 杜拉克談經理人的未來挑戰 / 彼得.杜拉克(Peter F. Drucker)著 ; 潘東傑譯
臺北市 : 天下遠見出版 ; 2006[民95] (新譯),頁372-74
日本、歐洲、美國的經理人對Drucker 的管理學論述的接納重點之說明(1994)。


我知道Deming 到過大半歐洲上過課,只有在德國沒有成立協會。

Drucker 認為日本、歐洲、美國的經理人對其管理學論述的接受是不一樣的。
日本的情形:
 (Drucker 希望全球的人都了解:管理,影響了人及其生活,不只在企業之中,還有其他很多層面的應該,我們要特別注意。它值得我們學習。)


.....我讓企業與經理人更加認識行銷的真諦:你要讓市場導引你的企業,要傾聽客戶的聲音,並聽取其欲求和需要。
......要根據市場願意支付的價格來設計產品。
.....要將員工視為主要的資源。唯有尊重員工,才能達成真正的生產力。
....日本人似乎相信"世界經濟"真的存在。要做生意就做全世界的,只顧國內市場是畫地自限。



歐洲還有經理人認為"一切歸我所有",其他同事都是幫手而已。......他們將我的"管理是專業"之說法,當成是一種宣言,有點反文化。

美國經理人開始了解:人力不僅是成本,更是一種資源。做好人力管理才能達成目標。
.....其次,我幫助他們了解"管理"能讓其企業脫胎換骨。




Managing in a Time of Great Change (1995) 視野 : 杜拉克談經理人的未來挑戰

  • 1995: Managing in a Time of Great Change (New York: Truman Talley Books/Dutton)

巨變時代的管理 / 彼得.杜拉克(Peter F. Drucker)作 ; 周文祥,慕心譯
臺北縣新店市 : 中天出版 , 民87[1998]
視野 : 杜拉克談經理人的未來挑戰 / 彼得.杜拉克(Peter F. Drucker)著 ; 潘東傑譯
臺北市 : 天下遠見出版 ;  2006[民95] (新譯)




杜拉克以他一貫的宏觀視野、深邃的分析與有力的筆調,透過《視野》指引人類社會未來的方向。本書分為四篇,涵蓋企業外部環境的新挑戰、經營的實踐理論、資訊社會與知識工作者、企業組織的新類型,以及未來的經濟市場等主題。
 首篇,杜拉克將告訴經理人,什麼是管理?內容包括,什麼是不確定性規劃、企業有哪五種忌諱、如何管理家族企業、總統有哪6個守則,與網絡社會的管理,杜拉克針對經理人,多年來一直視為理所當然的市場假設與經營準則,提出不同的思考角度。 
第二篇,討論管理、經濟與社會的重要變化,就是「資訊」的出現並成為知識工作者的關鍵資源,以及組織架構將會受到資訊社會的何種衝擊;包括,新組織社會的出現、零售業的資訊革命、哪些才是關鍵資訊。 
第三篇,是關於市場與世界經濟,其中有新權力中心、新成長市場,與新興的產業。杜拉克會告訴你,未來的新市場在哪裡、環太平洋區有哪些新的經濟勢力,以及海外華人新經濟強權的崛起。

 最後,杜拉克將會分析社會與政府的角色變化,對中國大陸、日本以及海外華人提出他的建言;包括,知識工作與性別角色、21世紀的經濟世界、非營利組織與政府的未來功能。



前言
超越未來



本書各篇文章(兩篇訪談紀要,一在頭,一在尾,中間穿插25章)儘管包羅萬象,主題只有一個:它們都在探討一些已經發生且不可逆轉的變化。也就是說,這些都是主管能夠且必須採取因應行動的變化。本書各篇文章都不是要預測未來,而是討論主管可以做些什麼、必須做些什麼,以便成功地邁向未來。

預測未來沒那麼難,只是沒什麼意義。許多未來學家的預言命中率很高,這是他們自我評價與別人評價他們的一種衡量標準。他們在預測某些事情上表現不錯;但是,已經發生的基本變化永遠是更重要的,卻沒有人預測到,或根本不可能預測到這些變化。

回顧10年前,沒有人在1985年預測或可能預測到,歐洲經濟共同體(European Economic Community)的建立,竟無法帶動歐洲經濟爆炸性成長,反而帶來十年的經濟停滯與為小事紛爭不已。因此,就世界經濟的實力來看,一九九五年統一的歐洲,反而比1985年分裂的歐洲還要弱。

10年前,沒有人預測到或可能預測到,中國大陸會有石破天驚的經濟成長;這個成長是總要來的,和政府的政策沒什麼關係;也沒有人可以預測到,5,500萬海外華人會成為新興經濟強權。10年前也沒有人可以預測,資訊革命對企業的最大衝擊,會是徹底的重新思考與改組最古老且深入各層面的資訊系統,也就是財務人員的會計模式。

不過,同樣重要的是,一個人不可能替未來作決策。決策是行動的承諾,行動永遠是現在式,而且只有現在式。然而,現在的行動也是唯一能夠實現未來的方法。主管拿人錢財就是要做事,要採取有效的行動;他們只能就現況思考,並且善用已經發生的變化,才能採取有效的行動。

本書一開始要探討主管的工作,也就是管理;在管理者的世界中已經發生的事情,使得過去40年來已被視為理所當然的假設、準則與實務,再度受到質疑(甚至變得過時)。第二篇,我會討論管理、經濟與社會的一個特定基本變化:資訊的出現並成為主管的關鍵資源,以及組織的架構;此篇的討論前提是一個古諺:你不是掌握工具,就是被工具控制;主管要學習什麼,才能掌握新工具呢?

第三篇,內容將脫離管理與組織,轉向市場與世界經濟,其中有新權力中心、新成長市場,與新成長產業。最後,在第四篇我會分析社會與政府的變化;或許這是「社會的變遷世紀」(Century of Social Transformations)中最大的變化,在20世紀,政府曾經輝煌一時,也曾一敗塗地。

不過是30(或許只有20)年前吧,人們常說雖然當時的經理人與主管比1920年代要多(一次大戰前就更別提了),但做的事情與做事的方法幾乎沒太大差別;現在可沒人這麼說今日的經理人與主管了。如果今天有一件事是確定的話,那就是明日的經理人與主管所做的事,會和今日的同事更加不同,做事的方式也會更為不同。讓今日的主管,超越這個迥然不同的明日,其實也就是成功地讓這個明日成為主管的明日,這正是本書的目標。

彼得˙杜拉克
1995年5月,于加州克萊蒙特

第五章 總統六守則

柯林頓之前的歷任總統,無論在能力、個性、價值觀、風格與成就上,可以說是包羅萬象;要再找一個如此多樣化的群體,還真是不容易。不過,只要遵守六大管理守則,這些前任總統就算再弱也能效率滿滿;要是違反這六大守則,再強的也只能事倍功半。

專心一致,不要事必躬親

「該做什麼?」是總統該問的第一件事。
就算某件事是他的主打焦點,他也不可剛愎自用。

杜魯門(Harry Truman)在1945年4月接任美國總統,一如美國大眾,他認為既然二次大戰即將結束,美國可以也應該把重心放在國內事務上,他全心投入恢復「新政」(New Deal)的工作。但讓他能成為一位有效率的總統,是他在幾週內就接受了國際事務(尤其是圍堵史達林向全球的侵略)優先的現實,即便他是老大不願意。

美國政治似乎有一個法則,那就是世局總會在大選日與就職日之間生變。不肯接受這個現實(一如卡特當年一樣),就是沒有原則;否定現實,只會換來一陣瞎忙。

第二守則就是:「專心一致」。通常「該做什麼?」會有差不多六個答案可選,但是總統只能選定一個答案(這是充滿風險與爭議),否則將一事無成。

儘管希特勒在歐洲崛起以及日本侵略中國,羅斯福(Franklin Roosevelt)總統在任期的頭5年,對國際事物仍是嗤之以鼻。美國到1938年時仍陷於大蕭條的谷底,在心態上仍是高度閉關自守。然而,羅斯福總統幾乎是一夜之間,就把國際事務列為第一優先,幾乎忘了國內議題。30年後的詹森總統(Lyndon Johnson),企圖打越戰及消滅國內貧窮兩場戰役,結果是雙雙敗退。

總統的優先處理事項,一定要是攸關緊要之事。如果這項要務不具高度爭議性,那可能根本就不是要務。再者,這項要務必須迅速可行,也就是說,目標要有限度;但成功的話,這項要務的重要性,也必須能改變現狀。

雷根總統在1981年,決定把利率調得極高來遏止通貨膨脹時,就運用了這些準則。任何一位經濟系二年級的學生,都知道此舉將導致經濟大幅衰退;的確,失業率在幾個月內,就由原本居高不下的7.5%,一躍為10%,創下大蕭條以來的新高點。然而,遏止通膨確實是當時要務,它不但立即可行,並且改變了當時的經濟情勢。

雷根的作為奠下了日後就業擴張的基礎,這也是美國有史以來最大一次的就業擴張。此舉贏得美國大眾的信任,也讓雷根在就職8年間,廣受民眾支持。柯林頓要是能把缺乏醫療照顧的3,700萬美國人,優先加入健保醫療體系的話,那他就能像雷根一樣廣受民眾愛戴;可是,他卻不願意捲入政治角力,寧可把這個簡明可行的議題混入全民健保的大泥淖中。

總統守則第三條是:「沒有事情是絕對的」,意外也是正常的。華盛頓總統以降,大概只有羅斯福總統在1937年連任就職時,享有充分的民意支持;他不但以美國有史以來最高的得票率連任,同時也完全掌控了參眾兩院。

在這種情況下,羅斯福總統自信可以「重組」最高法院(包括賦予他任命6位大法官的權力),進而搬開這個對「新政」從中作梗的大石頭。他甚至沒有先丟出風向球,就逕行宣布他的重組計畫,結果立刻遭到參院的封殺,羅斯福自此也失去了掌控兩院的權力。

柯林頓大概也認為撤銷軍中同性戀禁令,也是當然的事,他沒有先徵詢一下民意就逕自宣布;此舉立刻導致他的民意支持率下滑,創下新任總統的歷史新低點。

美國人民把羅斯福的重組最高法院,視為是顛覆開國先賢的政治理想國,而不是在為受歡迎的「新政」鋪路。柯林頓的撤銷同性戀禁令,也被視為是降低部隊戰鬥力,而不是保障同志人權。這種認知上的差距,總是在事後看得清楚,但也就只是馬後砲罷了。所以說,一個行事有效率的總統,會瞭解政治一定帶有風險。

選上後,就別再搞競選活動了

總統守則第四條是:「事不躬親」。要美國總統親自出馬的工作,除了最有組織、精力最旺盛的人之外,一般人是做不來的。因此,不需要總統出馬的事,就絕對不要做。

總統往往距離事發現場太遠、太依賴他人的資訊(或隱瞞)、太忙著研究重點,因此事必躬親只會事倍功半。管理一個政府,本就是細部分工之事。詹森與卡特的例子都明白指出,一個事必躬親的總統,只會讓自己的聲望急遽下滑。

然而,美國的政治制度,包括總統在內的任何一位官員,都不必承擔政府績效的最後責任。一個有效率的總統一定要拒絕事必躬親的誘惑,只要確保每件事都有人在做就行。總統需要的,是一個具有高度紀律的小團隊,每個人明確負責一個領域。

羅斯福總統的內閣,可說是此種模式。10名閣員中有9位(國務卿除外),是我們現在所說的技術官僚,每個人專精一個領域。羅斯福表示:「我做決策,然後交代任務給閣員,接著就是讓他們充分發揮。」羅斯福內閣團隊的績優表現(例如,儘管政府支出前所未見的高,卻沒有傳出一件財務醜聞),說明了為何他能掌握空前未有的總統權勢。

後來的歷任總統,也希望能像羅斯福一樣有效率,因此設置了幕僚長的職位,卻不管用。柯林頓所選擇的替代方案,就是廣設副部長、次長、助理部長及特別助理等等,這麼做只是治絲益棼,搞得政府成天有開不完的大會。

林肯的格言:「總統在政府機構內不要有朋友」,也是總統守則第五條。忽視這項守則的總統,全都後悔當初未謹遵教誨。

別相信「總統之友」。他們的主子是誰?替誰說話?他們實際的老闆又是誰?好一點的,就是這些「友人」越級報告;差一點的,這些人就是做總統的耳目。最重要的是,這些人隨時想要靠著這層「友誼」濫用職權。

如果這群人受賄或透過其他不法手段自肥或是「照顧」家屬,接下來爆發的「財務醜聞」肯定上頭條新聞。非財務的濫用職權(例如,為某個利益團體拿到特殊待遇)通常會被壓下來,但這種形式的胡作非為,對總統行事效率、政策及聲望的打擊,卻比財務不法行徑來的大。

總統也是人,而且是高處不勝寒的人。身為政治人物,他們一般喜歡交際,往往渴求有人作伴、體諒。這也說明了為何當總統的,喜歡進用友人,即使友人不適任或辜負所託,也極不願意撤換他們。

但是,有效率的總統應該向最愛交際的老羅斯福總(Teddy Roosevelt)學習。即使擔任總統,羅斯福依然活躍在社交圈,但他的六個「親信」,卻沒有一個人入閣。

許多總統夫人﹝杜魯門總統的妻子貝絲(Bess Truman)就是最明顯的例子﹞,都是總統的的顧問與知己,但把第一夫人安插到政府部門內的,柯林頓要屬第一人。

那總統守則第六條呢?就是杜魯門送給新科總統甘迺迪(John F. Kennedy)的忠告:「選上後,就別再搞競選活動了。」

(1993年)

第十二章 關鍵資訊

自從新的資料處理工具,在30、40年前首度出現時,企業人不是高估,就是低估資訊在組織內的重要性。我們高估了電腦「商業模式」(business models)的運作能力,以為這些模式能夠做決策,或是可以協助處理大部分的業務。不過,我們也同樣低估這些新工具,認為它們只不過是錦上添花的工具罷了。

現在沒有人再談論商業模式,協助做經濟決策的話題。資料處理的最大貢獻,甚至不是在管理,而是在作業;像是電腦輔助設計,或是功能強大的建築設計軟體。

不過,就算是我們高估或低估了這些新工具,但我們還是忽略了,這些新工具會快速改變各項待解決的任務這個事實。

歷史不斷地告訴我們,觀念與工具兩者是相互依存、互動與共變的。企業就是這個觀念,資訊就是那個工具,目前這兩者正在交互影響。新工具將讓我們能夠(其實,說不定是迫使)以不同的觀點,來看待我們的企業,把企業視為:
■資源創造者:也就是能把成本轉為收益的組織。
■經濟鏈中的一個環節:管理人員必須全盤瞭解這個經濟鏈,才能管理成本。
■創造財富的社會機構。
■物質環境的創造者:這個物質環境,是屬於組織的外部環境,它提供組織機會與成果,但也威脅企業的成功與存續。

本文在於探討主管人員,獲取必要資訊所需要的工具,以及這些工具的基本觀念。

有些工具已經存在一段時間了,但幾乎從未被運用在企業管理;有些必須重新設計,以符合現代管理潮流;有些工具是明日之星,但是尚未定型,仍待設計。

雖然我們才正開始瞭解,如何把資訊當作一項工具來使用,但我們已經能勾勒出,有助企業管理的資訊系統要件。相對的,我們亦可以開始瞭解,明日企業(姑且稱之為:重新設計過的公司)的基本概念。

從成本會計到收益控制

我們或許已經把會計,這個最傳統的資訊系統,做了極大的變革。其實,許多企業已經由傳統成本會計(traditional cost accounting),轉為作業基礎成本制(activity-based costing)。後者,體現了企業流程的不同觀念(特別是製造業),以及不同的衡量方法。

通用汽車在70年前,首度發展出傳統成本會計,規定總製造成本是個別作業成本的加總。然而真正攸關競爭力與獲利能力是「總流程成本」(the cost of the total process),新的作業基礎成本制,就是在記錄並控制這項成本。

作業基礎成本制的基本假設認為,製造活動是一項整體流程,始於原物料、零件送抵廠房,但不終於完成品交到最終使用者手上,因為售後服務仍屬於產品成本;安裝也算在成本內,即使是客戶付費。

傳統成本會計衡量的是,完成某一事項所需的成本,譬如刻螺紋;作業基礎成本制,則同時記錄閒置成本,像是機器待修成本、待料成本,存貨待運送成本,以及重製或剔除劣質零件成本。

傳統成本會計不能也不會,去計入的這類閒置成本,往往等於(有時甚至超過)「實作成本」(the costs of doing)。因此,作業基礎成本制不但可比較、有效地掌控成本,更能夠逐漸「控制成效」(result control)。

傳統成本會計假設,某項特定作業(像是加熱處理)是必要的,且必須在目前作業的特定區域內完成;作業基礎成本制,則會先問:「一定要做這項作業嗎?要做的話,在哪做最適當?」

作業基礎成本制會把以前分好幾項的活動,像是價值分析、流程分析、品質管理與成本計算,整合成單項分析。

運用整合分析,作業基礎成本制可以大大降低製造成本,有時可以整整壓低1/3以上。由於多數製造商已經體認到成本會計的不足,所以作業基礎成本制對服務業的衝擊最大,因為像是銀行、零售商店、醫院、學校、報社、廣播電臺,或電視台等等服務業,幾乎沒有成本資訊。

作業基礎成本制呈現出,傳統成本會計運用在服務業的成效不彰,倒不是說衡量技術有什麼問題,而是傳統成本會計的假設錯誤。

服務業不像製造業,它不能採用傳統成本會計的個別營運活動成本假設。服務業的成本制只有一個假設,那就是整體系統成本的假設,而且這個成本在任何一段既定時間內都是固定的。

傳統成本會計的固定與變動成本劃分,對服務業來說並沒有太大的意義。傳統成本會計的另一項基本假設:「資本可取代勞動」,也不適用於服務業。

事實上,額外的資本投資,將要有更多的勞動來配合,尤其是在知識工作領域。舉例來說,一家醫院購入一件新型診療器具,或許還得多加4-5個人來操作。

其他知識型組織,也得記取這個相同的道理:定期間的所有成本都是固定的、資源不能替代、總營運活動必須計算成本,這些都是作業基礎成本制的假設。把這些假設運用到服務業,我們就可以獲得成本資訊並控制收益。

例如,數十年來,銀行已經試過把傳統成本會計技術,運用到銀行業務,也就是算出個別營運活動,以及服務的成本,但成效很低。現在他們開始自問:「哪一項作業(activity),是成本與成效的關鍵所在?」答案是:「服務客戶」。

任何一項銀行業務的客戶,單位成本都是固定的,因此客戶單位收益(包括客戶的服務、使用量,及各項服務組合)才是成本與獲利的決定因素。

零售量販店(特別是在西歐各國),早已知道這個道理。他們的假設是,一旦設置了貨架單位空間,成本就是固定的,管理人員的任務就是要在既定期間內,追求貨架單位空間收益的極大化。就因為他們能專注在收益控制,儘管貨品單價與利潤都低,他們仍能提高整體獲利。

服務業才開始運用,新的成本觀念。有些領域(譬如,研究實驗室)的生產力很難衡量,往往只能依賴評估與判斷。但對多數的知識與服務工作來說,10-15年內,我們就應該能夠開發出可靠的工具,用來衡量並管理成本,並把成本與成果配合起來。

我們愈是能清楚地思考服務業的成本計算,我們就愈能洞悉各行各業,吸引並留住客戶的成本。舉例來說,如果通用、福特與克萊斯勒,早就使用作業基礎成本制的話,它們就會瞭解過去幾年的強力促銷,根本是徒勞的;它們提供新車買主高額折扣與巨額現金回饋,但這些促銷手段卻讓三大車廠損失慘重,不但花了大筆金錢,甚至還丟了不少客戶。

其實,每項促銷活動都讓三大車廠的現有市場地位滑落;然而,促銷的成本與負收益,並未反映在公司傳統成本會計的衡量數字中,因此管理人員渾然不知這些損失。

傳統成本會計只能單獨反映個別製造活動成本,而這些成本並不會被市場的折扣,或現金回饋所影響。此外,傳統成本會計也不會顯示出定價決策,對市場占有率的影響。

作業基礎成本制可以顯示(或至少試著顯示),每項作業成本與收益變化,對整體成效的影響。要是早用這種新成本制的話,三大車廠強力促銷手段的損失,就能及早顯現。

事實上,由於日本車廠已經使用了一種作業基礎成本制(雖然還是在摸索階段),因此,豐田、日產與本田早就較能掌握,如何以折扣戰來和美國車廠競爭,從而穩住其市場占有率及獲利。

從法律夢幻到經濟現實

瞭解本身營運成本是不夠的,要在競爭日益激烈的全球市場中勝出,公司就得瞭解整個經濟鏈的成本,並要和經濟鏈中的其他成員合作管理成本,並達成收益極大化。

因此,公司除了要計算組織內部成本之外,還要加計整體經濟流程成本。而在這個經濟過程中,規模再大的公司,也不過是其中的一個環節。

對股東、債權人與員工來說,公司這個法人是一個存在的實體;但就經濟層面來看,公司是一個虛構的觀念。30年前,可口可樂只是一個授權商,實際生產是由個別裝瓶廠負責。如今,美國多數的裝瓶作業都是直接隸屬於可口可樂;不過,可樂消費者根本不在乎是誰生產。左右市場的關鍵是經濟現實,也就是整體流程的成本,誰擁有什麼並不是重點。

在商業史上,一直重複出現這樣的案例,一家名不見經傳的公司,幾年內不費吹灰之力就登上業界寶座。理由總不外是高明的策略、技術、行銷,或是製造精簡化。

然而,在所有的案例中,新當家的也享有極大成本優勢,往往比對手要低30﹪,而原因也永遠是這些長江後浪,知道如何管理整體經濟鏈的成本,而不是只管理自己內部的成本。

就管理「集團企業」體系內,供應商與經銷商成本來說,豐田大概是一般人談得最多的例子。豐田透過此一網絡,把汽車製造、經銷,與維修的總成本,當作單一成本流來管理,誰的作業成本最低、收益最高,就交給誰做。

不過,發明「經濟成本流管理」的不是日本人,而是美國人。通用汽車的創辦人杜蘭特(William Durant),最先使用這個成本管理法。大約是1908年,杜蘭特開始收購成功的小公司,像是別克(Buick)、奧斯摩比(Oldsmobile)、凱迪拉克(Cadillac)與雪佛蘭(Chevrolet)等等,再把它們合併到新成立的通用汽車。杜蘭特在1916年,另外成立聯合汽車(United Motors)子公司,專門收購成功的小型零件公司。第一批收購的對,象包括岱頓工程實驗所公司(Dayton Engineering Laboratory Company, Delco),這家公司握有發明人凱特林(Charles Kettering)的電子自動啟動器專利。

杜蘭特買下大約20家零件供應商;1919年,也就是他被免除通用執行長職務的前一年,在最後一次的購併中,他買下費雪車體(Fisher Body)。杜蘭特一開始就處心積慮地把零配件供應商,納入新車設計流程中,這樣他就能把完成品的總成本,當作單一成本流來管理。所以說,「企業集團」其實是杜蘭特發明的。

不過,在1950年到1960年間,由於工會的運作,造成通用零件事業部的勞動成本,高於其他獨立供應商,杜蘭特主導的企業集團體系反而成為公司累贅。一些通用的外部客戶,像是派克(Packard)與士刁必架(Studebaker)等獨立車廠,由於通用零件部產出的50﹪是賣給這兩家公司,零件成本的提高,使得這兩家公司紛紛求去,通用企圖控制零件主供應商成本與品質的計畫,亦隨之落空。

不過,在40多年的時間,通用的系統成本制確實讓它享有無人可及的成本優勢,就算是長期以來的最大競爭對手士刁必架,也難望其項背。

西爾斯百貨,是第一個模仿杜蘭特體制的公司;1920年代,西爾斯百貨與供應商簽訂長期合約,並買下對方的少數股權。西爾斯因此可以在供應商設計產品時,與他們討論,並管理整體成本流,這使得西爾斯數十年來享有無人能及的成本優勢。

1930年代初期,總部設於倫敦的馬克斯賓塞公司,模仿西爾斯百貨,同樣獲得成本優勢。20年後,日本企業在豐田汽車的帶頭下,研究並模仿了西爾斯與馬克斯賓塞。1980年代,渥爾瑪百貨則是把這項方法加以修正,允許供應商直接把產品庫存在貨架上,進而省掉倉儲費用與近1/3的傳統零售成本。

不過,這些公司仍是鳳毛麟角。自從1890年代新古典經濟學派的馬歇爾(Alfred Marshall),敘述過整體經濟鏈成本後,經濟學家已經知道它的重要性,但是企業人仍把它視為抽象理論。然而,管理經濟成本鏈已逐漸成為一個必然的趨勢;的確,主管除了要組織、管理成本鏈外,更要把其他事項(尤其是公司策略與產品規劃),當作一個經濟整體來考量,跳脫個別公司的法定限制。

成本訂價制(cost-led pricing)轉變成定價成本制(price-led costing),是驅使公司採用經濟鏈成本制的一個強大動力。西方企業,傳統上是以成本為基礎,往上加一個理想的利潤率,然後訂出售價,這就是成本訂價制。西爾斯與馬克斯賓塞,很早就轉為定價成本制,它是根據客戶願意支付的價格,來決定可容許成本,並且是在設計階段就開始這麼做。

一直到最近,都很少有公司採用定價成本制,如今它已成為制式工具。日本公司首先將定價成本制運用在外銷業務上,如今渥爾瑪及美國、日本及歐洲等其他量販店,也正在實施這種制度。克萊斯勒最近一些車款的成功,與通用釷星汽車的暢銷,都是拜定價成本制之賜。不過,唯有公司瞭解,並管理經濟鏈的整體成本,才能實施定價成本制。

同樣的觀念,也適用於委外、聯盟,及合資企業。其實,只要是基於夥伴而非控制關係的組織架構,都適用。這類的企業體,已取代傳統母公司完全擁有子公司的型態,逐漸成為企業成長的模式,尤其是在全球經濟的環境下。

不過,多數企業轉為經濟鏈成本制,都不是一帆風順的。首先,在整體經濟鏈中的各公司會計制度,必須齊一,或至少要互通。但事實上,每家公司都有自己的會計制度,而且只有自己的制度才是可行的。

此外,經濟鏈成本制需要各公司資訊共享;但是,就算是在自己的公司內,一般人對資訊共享都是很抗拒的。儘管挑戰多,企業現在一樣能找到方法,實施經濟鏈成本制,寶鹼公司就是一例。

寶鹼採用渥爾瑪與供應商,培養緊密關係的模式,和全世界300家供銷寶鹼產品的大型零售商,共享資訊,並實施經濟鏈管理。

不管是什麼困難,經濟鏈成本制都是勢在必行。否則,就算是最有效率的企業,也會因成本優勢的逐漸喪失而挫敗。

摘錄自第12章